Europe 2024:
Key Political Risks
Part 1
Petro Kopka, Principal Expert and Strategic Adviser at COSA
The relevance of the military paradigm in Europe is increasing. After two years of the full-scale Russo-Ukrainian war, the European political establishment, and even some average Europeans, are finally beginning to grasp the reality that the war is not going to end anytime soon. Moreover, it is much more dangerous than they realised and may spill over the western borders of Ukraine and drench the peaceful European lands in blood at any moment.
It seems 2024 may well be the year when the fate of the European Union and some individual countries, particularly in Eastern Europe, is decided. The issue is no longer the weakening of the European Union’s position, but the survival of the European integration processes as such.
Let us then consider the key risks we should be paying attention to in the immediate term.
Political risks
Growing Euroscepticism and national egoism
The European Parliament election this July is the most important challenge, and risk, at present. In some areas, it may even be called a threat to the current political system of the European Union.
In addition to the overall negative effect on the situation in Europe, the Russo-Ukrainian war has deepened the rifts inside the EU, which used to be resolved by means of negotiations of various degrees of complexity and duration.
With a large-scale war in Europe, any given situation requires a prompt reaction on the part of the EU leadership, which must find new forms and methods of working with member states to attain its goals without breaking the basic principles of the Union, as exemplified all too clearly by Hungary.
As the EU finds it increasingly difficult to function, Euroscepticism (a strong mixture of national egoism and nationalism) among its member states is growing. Those who oppose the integration processes both inside and outside the EU have been actively cultivating these dangerous negative tendencies.
The chief sponsor of destructive processes in Europe, Moscow puts increasingly less effort into concealing its role as the initiator and coordinator of everything that is pulling the EU apart. Contrary to some expectations, Russia’s influence has grown considerably after the start of its full-scale war against Ukraine. All is fair in love and war is the common adage, and in war, one must know one’s enemy.
The numbers of pro-Russian organisations in Europe have grown with the addition of Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (German: Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht or BSW) in Germany. Founded in January 2024, it was probably created with the specific purpose of participating in the European election. According to experts, the Alliance may become an attractor for similar organisations and the largest populist left party in the European Parliament. As for Sahra Wagenknecht, she considers creating a separate faction in the parliament if her Alliance finds enough allies in other EU countries (23 in no less than seven EU members states).
The Russo-Ukrainian war also triggered an increase in national egoism, a philosophy that prioritises national interests over collective ones. Facing an uncertain future, national governments are looking for ways to sidestep Brussels and solve their problems independently. At the same time, national politics is usually made vulnerable to the voters’ dissatisfaction with some decisions of the EU. Such is the situation with the grain exports at Ukraine’s western border, for instance.
It appears that the issue cannot be resolved without Brussels. An attempt to devolve it to national governments resulted in the problem scaling up, with agrarians from Germany, France, Italy, and Spain promising to support the Polish farmers’ blockade.
In other words, an agricultural industry issue that would be routine in peacetime has turned into a pressure point for the entire European Union due to the presence of the war factor. It would be remiss of Russia not to take advantage of the situation. As a result, the Kremlin can now use both politics and agriculture (and, by extension, logistics, through the Polish lorry operators) as leverage in any way it sees fit.
The endless flow of cheap Russian grain into Europe is a separate issue in this category. It also includes the grain Russia had literally stolen from Ukraine. Perhaps, the time has come to take a closer look at it?
Faced with all these factors, who can deny that they are indicative of preparations being made to invade a pre-selected country? After all, the call on the Russian ‘Tsar’ to “come and put things right” in Poland, which was displayed on a tractor next to the flag of the USSR (dead and gone as it seemed back in 1991), was not an accident. It was an isolated attempt to test the waters, but it was significant. If we consider the Russian leader’s claims about the beginning of the Second World War and Poland’s role in it, which he made in the interview with Tucker Carlson, and the rather muted response of Warsaw, the military scenario no longer appears that far-fetched.
All of the above is possible because the specter of the upcoming elections in Russia and the U.S. is haunting Europe. It cannot be seen, but its political effects are felt acutely. EU politicians are being prudent when they gear themselves up to be able to respond to any outcome.
When it comes to Russia, everything is clear, more or less. We have to be ready for a continued war and a possible escalation by the Kremlin. As for the United States, the situation there is more ambiguous, which is why one must prepare for all eventualities.
A staunch supporter of Donald Trump, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s position is indicative in that respect. Having established a friendly relationship with the Russian autocrat, Orbán is waiting for his overseas idol to triumph. He is so certain of Trump’s winning the election that he went as far as refusing to meet the bipartisan delegation of U.S. congressmen who came to Budapest to talk to their Hungarian counterparts in the executive branch of government. At the same time, Orbán is trying to unblock the financial aid for Hungary in the EU.
Thus, the EU has been facing a new reality since the beginning of the full-scale invasion of Russia into Ukraine. It has to continue functioning while a military conflict between two states is raging in Europe, a conflict where the aggressor is an important part of the European economic system the West has been trying to pull to the democratic side for decades.
As it turns out, the old saying about the leopard being unable to change its spots is true when applied to Russia. Politicians in Europe must quickly find an optimal way to navigate between the necessities of upholding the democratic principles of building a better future for a united Europe and confronting the brute force coming from the East.
Ultimately, the fate of Ukraine depends on whether such a way is found, i.e. whether Europe is able to uphold its current position and continue to support Ukraine until the country wins the unjust war against it or whether the EU succumbs to pressure, changes its methods, and starts negotiating with the aggressor.
Foreign assistance is crucial for Ukraine. The EU is one of its key collective partners that ensure its survival and ability to fight the Russian aggressor. Therefore, the situation in the European Union is of critical importance for Kyiv.
Coming up next, the second part of this article discusses the security risks and the development of the military–industrial complex in EU countries.