Europe 2024:
Defence & Security Risks
Part 2
Petro Kopka, Principal Expert and Strategic Adviser at COSA
The urgency of the military paradigm in Europe is increasing. After two years of the full-scale Russo-Ukrainian war, the European political establishment, and even some average Europeans, are finally beginning to grasp the reality that the war is not going to end anytime soon. Moreover, it is much more dangerous than they realised, and may spill over the western borders of Ukraine and drench the peaceful European lands in blood at any moment.
It seems 2024 may well be the year when the fate of the European Union and some individual countries, particularly in Eastern Europe, is decided. The issue is no longer the weakening of the European Union’s position, but the survival of the European integration processes as such.
In the first article, we examined political risks. Here, we are focusing on the immediate prospects in terms of defence and security.
Defence industry
EU member states are facing an acute problem. The state of their military-industrial complexes is not altogether satisfactory. In addition to other issues, the two years of the Russo-Ukrainian war have shown that peacetime weapons and military equipment production rates are not up to scratch in times of war.
Moreover, as the Russo-Ukrainian war continues, it has become clear what types of armaments are important in the fight against an enemy like Russia.
Thus, the future development of the military-industrial complexes of the EU members is yet another European issue in need of a long overdue solution, the lack of which poses a serious risk. It appears an effective solution would be to coordinate efforts within NATO itself and involve the European Union more heavily due to the situation in the United States of America.
Security risks
Throughout the entire post-war period, the security politics of the European Union was based on the primacy of the idea that the Euro-Atlantic solidarity was unshakable due to common Western democratic traditions and principles. NATO was created as a practical application of that idea. The principle of indivisible security, of which Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty is the quintessence, serves as the basis for NATO operation.
The paradigm was unshakable until 2016, when Donald Trump entered the White House. The statements he made as U.S. President raised concerns among his European counterparts regarding the future of the collective security. Although some of his demands were justified (for instance, the ones concerning U.S. defence spending as compared to European budgets), his tolerant and PC counterparts in Europe were shocked by his wording. This year, Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump’s statements have shown that his position remains the same, even though the global situation has changed drastically since 2020.
In other words, it was once again made clear to the Europeans that they must leave the American defence umbrella behind and start solving their problems on their own.
For instance, Italian Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani called for creation of the EU’s own army. A similar proposition was made by the Poles. The Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs Radosław Sikorski suggested the EU should form an “army of volunteers” to deter Russia.
However, building an army to defend EU member states from foreign aggression takes time, which Europe does not have. It has only two options. Either it provides the Ukrainian Armed Forces with everything they need to counter the Russian aggression on the Ukrainian soil, or it puts its trust in NATO’s potential power, hoping that the United States abide by Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty if the aggression escalates and Russia attacks any of Ukraine’s European allies.
The first option seems the more acceptable of the two, given the current processes in the internal U.S. politics.
Generally, if the problem of creating a future pan-European security architecture for the European Union is to be solved effectively, the option of involving the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the process as a full-fledged (and possibly the core) element should be considered, since the AFU have practical experience of warfare. That is, if Russia is to be preserved in its current configuration.
Does the idea seem fantastic? Perhaps. And yet, our chaotic times do call for desperate measures.
